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WILLIAM JAMES’S USE OF TEMPERAMENTS AND TYPES 
RESEARCH NOTE 
 
David E. Leary 




What did William James mean when he claimed that the history of 
philosophy is “to a great extent” a “clash of human temperaments”? 
Did this mean that philosophers, in his estimation, are bound to 
represent one or the other type, or orientation, associated with 
various generalized philosophical positions? Did it mean that 
philosophers were necessarily, in his terminology, either “tender- 
minded” or “tough-minded”? And if philosophical arguments are, in 
fact, expressions of physiological factors, through what means do 
these factors achieve expression? What, in sum, did James mean to 
imply when he invoked the concept of “temperament” and used the 
related notion of categorical “type”? How are we to understand and 
apply whatever insights he had to offer? 
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n the opening chapter of Pragmatism, William James famously 
argued that the history of philosophy is “to a great extent” a 
“clash of human temperaments.”1 Although philosophers like 
to offer “impersonal reasons” for their conclusions, he said, in 
fact their temperament “loads the evidence … one way or the other, 
making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the 
universe.”2 Every philosopher, James observed, “trusts his 
temperament” and wants “a universe” that suits it.3 This should not 
be surprising. The same clash of temperaments, he noted, can be 
seen in many areas of human life. While it is manifested within 
philosophy in the conflict between “your [empiricistic] lover of facts 
in all their crude variety,” on the one hand, and “your [rationalistic] 
devotee to abstract and eternal principles,” on the other, parallel 
differences are apparent in the realm of manners between 
“formalists and free-and-easy persons”; in government, between 
“authoritarians and anarchists”; in literature, between “purists or 
academicals, and realists”; and in art, between “classics and 
romantics.”4 And all of these differences make a difference, inciting 
antipathy between these temperamentally diverse groups. Thus, 
after compiling a list of characteristics associated with “tender- 
minded” rationalists and “tough-minded” empiricists, James 
underscored how “the tough think of the tender as sentimentalists or 
soft-heads” and “the tender feel the tough to be unrefined, callous, 
or brutal,” their mutual apprehension being akin to the way 
“Bostonian tourists” and “a population like that of Cripple Creek” 
think and feel about one another.5 
In light of James’s frequent use of contrasting pairs like the ones 
above—in Pragmatism, for example, between intellectualists and 
sensationalists, idealists and materialists, optimists and pessimists, 
religious and non-religious, free-willists and fatalists, monists and 
pluralists, and dogmatists and skeptics—it is important to emphasize 
that he did not intend to suggest any metaphysical or essential 
dualities.6 Rather, James used what we might call conceptual or 
methodological dualities in a purely descriptive way, largely as 
rhetorical devices, contrasting rarely if ever encountered extremes 
(idealized representatives) of opposing points of view and opposing 
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behavioral tendencies, to make his arguments clearer and more 
persuasive. Even in the midst of his discussion of “tender-minded” 
and “tough-minded” philosophers, for instance, James explicitly 
indicated that he was talking about a spectrum of philosophical 
mentalities, a continuum ranging from the most rationalistic, at one 
end, to the most empiricistic, at the other. Only a relatively few 
historical figures, individuals like Plato, Locke, Hegel, and Spencer, 
have exhibited sufficiently “radical idiosyncracy” to “set their stamp 
and likeness on philosophy,” thus coming to signify something like 
a pure type.7 Indeed, “most of us have … no very definite 
intellectual temperament,” James acknowledged; “we are a mixture 
of opposite ingredients, each one present very moderately.”8 And 
the same caveat applied to his other dualistic distinctions—in 
psychology, for instance, between explosive and obstructed will, 
and in his study of religious experiences, between the “once-born” 
healthy-minded and the “twice-born” sick-minded.9 
Nevertheless, in these and many other instances, this kind of 
typological thinking helped James elucidate and advance his 
argument. And it is worth pointing out that in many instances of 
dualistic thinking James indicated that extreme cases have their own 
limitations as well as benefits. Meanwhile, “most of us,” he 
admitted, “have a hankering for the good things on both sides of the 
line.”10 And, in fact, after so famously distinguishing “tender- 
minded” and “tough-mind” philosophers, James explicitly went on 
to invite his readers to integrate qualities from both empiricism and 
rationalism. Indeed, he offered “the oddly-named thing pragmatism 
as a philosophy” precisely because it “can satisfy both kinds of 
demand.”11 And even though he actually proposed pragmatism as 
an epistemological method rather than a fully-constituted 
philosophical metaphysics, James did go on to fulfill crucial 
demands of both empiricism and idealism in his own metaphysical 
system (i.e., radical empiricism) by extending the empirical so far 
that it incorporated the subjective dimensions of experience.12 
In sum, types for James were convenient conceptual or 
methodological tools, intended to facilitate understanding without 
introducing new essences into the various continua of experience. 
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But how about his use of temperament, which seems to have a 
specific biological point of reference? Is it a methodological or 
rhetorical device of the same kind, or did James want us to take it 
literally as a genetic, physiological, or neurological cause of how we 
tend to perceive, think, feel, and act? If not quite either, is there some 
intermediate way of understanding his use of this term? To answer 
these questions, we must consider what James said about 
psychological terminology and then consult his actual use of the 
term over the full extent of his writing. 
Throughout his Principles, James cautioned readers against 
conferring narrowly exclusive meaning to psychological terms. We 
do not yet know enough, he repeated over and over, to assume that 
any of our terms has a specific or univocal reference, much less 
adequate definition. Indeed, one of the principal sources of error in 
psychology, James asserted, is “the misleading influence of 
speech.”13 In particular, he criticized the assumption that then-extant 
terms in the psychological lexicon had clear or singular referents, 
while also emphasizing that the absence of terms need not indicate 
the non-existence of still-unnamed phenomena. Psychology was at 
far too early a stage to warrant any strict standardization or 
regulation of its language. For this reason, in Principles, James used 
“consciousness” and “thinking,” “thought” and “feeling,” even 
“attention” and “will” interchangeably at times.14 And if his caution 
extended even to these commonly used terms, it applied all the more 
to terms like “temperament,” which were variously defined, 
variously explained, and variously attributed to different phenomena 
in contemporary thought.15 In 1880, for instance, Henry Maudsley, 
in a book that James used as a seminar text in 1896-97, wrote that 
“temperament” and “idiosyncrasy” are “big words” that 
 
are at present little better than cloaks of ignorance; they are 
symbols representing unknown quantities rather than words 
denoting definite conditions; and no more useful work could be 
undertaken in psychology than a patient and systematic study of 
individuals—the scientific and accurate dissection and 
classification of the minds and characters of particular men in 
correlation with their features and habits of body.16 
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And eleven years later, Théodule Ribot, in another book with which 
James was very familiar, expressed the same view, that 
 
the doctrine of the temperaments, as old as medical science itself, 
ever criticised and ever remodelled, is the vague and uncertain 
expression of the principal types of the physical personality, as 
furnished by observation, with the principal psychical traits that 
spring from them…. If the determination of temperaments could 
be rendered scientific, the question of personality would be greatly 
simplified.17 
 
But the determination was obviously not yet scientific in 1891, 
nor even in the early 1900s, when temperament was defined in a 
very brief entry of the authoritative Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology as the “characteristic difference in congenital 
constitution of individuals, manifested, e.g., by differences in their 
emotional susceptibilities, in the rapidity of their mental processes, 
in the fixity of their conations.”18 Following this seemingly 
unambiguous definition, the ante-scientific status of the term was 
implicitly acknowledged when the authors then divided 
temperament into the same categories—sanguine, melancholic, 
choleric, and phlegmatic—used by ancient Galenic medicine, and 
succinctly described what was “supposed” about each. It was only 
in the second half of the twentieth century that temperament and its 
types were defined in a scientifically reliable way and empirically 
validated as relevant variables in developmental and personality 
studies, as James and others had essentially hypothesized that they 
would be.19 
It is not surprising, then, that James himself avoided any 
technical or substantive use of temperament, and in fact the word 
does not appear, as one might expect it would, in the index of his 
biologically grounded Principles. Indeed, the only extensive use of 
temperament, in all of James’s works, is in Varieties, where it serves 
an analogous role to the one it fulfills in Pragmatism: as the key to 
one’s susceptibility or openness to this or that type of perception, 
thought, or feeling, albeit this time of a religious rather than 
philosophical nature. As he put it, one must be “temperamentally 
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qualified” for a given type of faith.20 But here, too, no further 
specification of any biological factors is provided. 
This leads the present author to conclude that temperament, in 
and of itself, was not a crucial variable for James, but rather—in 
Pragmatism and elsewhere—it served as a stand-in for various 
biologically grounded (and pragmatically equivalent) psychological 
processes about which he had written in many other places, but 
which were not yet linked in any detail or with any certitude to 
particular physiological, neurological, or genetic aspects of 
temperament.21 Even though the word suggested that (unspecified) 
biological processes were associated with a person’s psychological 
constitution, it was that psychological constitution and the related 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral inclinations that mattered. This 
could put an end to the matter, except that it should be acknowledged 
(before concluding) that James did go on to say, in Pragmatism, that 
“the picture I have given [of the temperamental differences between 
different types of philosophers] is, however coarse and sketch, 
literally true. Temperaments with their cravings and refusals do 
determine men in their philosophies, and always will.”22 Although 
this was adamantly stated, it was similarly unaccompanied by any 
stipulation of what precise biological foundations accounted for 
these traits.23 
The solution to the riddle, then, seems to lie in two statements 
of fact: (1) James assumed and sometimes stated that all 
psychological traits, like all psychological phenomena, have 
neurological or physiological foundations. (2) What he was 
concerned about was never temperament per se, but the 
psychological traits associated with them. Thus, it is not “tender- 
bodied” or “tough-bodied” but “tender-minded” and “tough- 
minded” characteristics that lead to different philosophical 
orientations. And although James could not offer any specific 
account of the genetic, physiological, or neurological states 
underlying these characteristics, he could and did offer accounts of 
the psychological factors that are involved: the needs, desires, and 
demands stemming from each individual’s personal interests, 
whether intellectual or practical, aesthetic or moral. However these 
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might be theoretically undergirded by physiological states, they lead 
to selective perception, selective conception, indeed, to selection all 
the way up and down the hierarchy of psychological processes, 
according to James, extending from sensation and perception at the 
one end to volition and action on the other.24 And it is always the 
practical consequences rather than theoretical origins that matter in 
James’s considerations. It is how one reacts to what he or she has 
experienced that makes a difference. The effects of perceptions, 
thoughts, feelings, and actions, not their physical stimuli or 
biological sources, are what James ultimately cared about. Whatever 
their biological foundations, what was important to him were the 
psychological phenomena and processes whose existence he 
assumed to be so grounded. It was these, not any hypothesized 
underlying temperamental factor per se, that made the crucial 
difference for James.25 
For these reasons, any discussion of James’s thesis about the 
temperamental foundations of philosophical attitudes (other than 
discussions that seek to update his position with evidence from 
twenty-first-century research) should focus on psychological rather 
than temperamental phenomena—on the personal characteristics, 
experiences, and concerns—that underlie his psychological as well 
as philosophical thinking.26 This focus is consistent with James’s 
later discussion of “The Types of Philosophic Thinking” (in the first 
chapter of A Pluralistic Universe), in which he underscores that 
“individuality outruns all classification” and directs his readers to 
the manifest phenomena of attention and selection rather than any 
underlying temperament as the crucial source of the “sketch” that 
each philosopher offers of the universe.27 “A philosophy is the 
experience of a man’s intimate character,” James said there, “and all 
definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions 
of human characters upon it.”28 It is by “feeling the whole push, and 
seeing the whole drift of life, forced on one by one’s total character 
and experience,” he argued in 1909, that one achieves “one’s best 
working attitude.”29 This is true for all philosophers, James argued: 
their working attitudes, revolving around their personal 
characteristics, experiences, and concerns, which is to say, their 
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personal interests and their resulting selective attention and 
reactions, shape their thought about themselves and their approach 
to the world around them. This was no less true of himself…and he 
wanted it no other way.30 
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NOTES 
This paper, despite the number and length of its footnotes, was conceived 
as a narrowly focused “note” rather than full-blown “article.” It touches 
on a topic covered exceptionally well, with greater sweep and detail, yet 
differently, in Francesca Bordogna’s “The Psychology and Physiology of 
Temperament.” The distinction around which this paper pivots, providing 
its raison d’être, is the actual pragmatic use of “temperament” and “type” 
in James’s thought, a use that emphasized the psychological consequences 
(formulated here as “personal characteristics, experiences, and concerns”) 
of what James took to be their broadly physiological underpinnings. These 
consequences are what mattered in his work, both when he did and when 
he did not specifically cite “temperament” or “type” as a factor. Bordogna 
is no doubt correct in claiming that James believed in the ultimate 
biological foundation of psychology, and hence of philosophy, but in 
actual practice it was (for him) the more proximate psychological 
consequences of temperament and type that motivated psychological and 
philosophical, as well as artistic, religious, and moral creations. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that he designated psychology, not physiology, as 
“the antechamber of metaphysics” (James, “Review of Grundzüge,” 296), 
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nor was it inconsistent that after accepting Johannes Müller’s dictum, 
nemo psychologus nisi physiologus, James hastened to add that it was 
“doubly true” (emphasis added) that, “so far as the nerve-centres go, nemo 
physiologus nisi psychologus” (James, “Review of The Functions,” 336). 
One cannot do nerve-physiology of any extensive sort without prior 
awareness of the psychological phenomena to be explained. 
1 James, Pragmatism, 11. 
2  James, 11. 
3  James, 11. 
4  James, 12. 
5 James, Pragmatism, 13–14. James’s claim about the temperamental 
foundations of philosophy was not a late-career invention. Twenty-eight 
years earlier, he had described one of his first substantive publications as 
“the first chapter of a psychological work on the motives which lead men 
to philosophize” (James, “Sentiment of Rationality,” 64). In that article, 
James wrote that “a man’s philosophic attitude is determined by the 
balance in him of … two cravings,” namely, a craving for “ease” and 
“simplicity” and a craving for “clearness” and “distinction”: in short, 
between an inclination toward rational unity and a partiality for empirical 
multiplicity (James, 38). Further, he argued that any philosophy 
necessarily achieves its “monstrous abridgment” of “the fulness of the 
truth” by the “casting out of real matter”, with each remaining concept 
reflecting “a particular interest in the conceiver” (James, 55-6). (He had 
explicated the interest-based selectivity of the mind in even earlier 
publications: his “Review of Grundzüge der physiologischen 
Psychologie” and his articles on “Brute and Human Intellect” and 
“Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence.”) James 
built upon these three articles several years later in “Rationality, Activity 
and Faith,” where he noted that his earlier article on “The Sentiment of 
Rationality” had exhibited “the failure of the purely logical function in 
philosophizing” as it argued that, “for a philosophy to succeed,” it must 
“define the future congruously with our spontaneous powers” (James, 
“Rationality, Activity and Faith,” 58, 64). In other words, “personal 
temperament… will make itself felt” in one’s preference for this or that 
philosophy. Fifteen years later, James combined the original “Sentiment” 
with portions of “Rationality, Activity and Faith” to create the chapter on 
“The Sentiment of Rationality” in The Will to Believe. Much of what he 
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said in these articles regarding the psychological motives of 
philosophizing was prompted by his reading of Arthur Schopenhauer, as 
reflected in James’s statement that “the whole man within us is at work 
when we form our philosophical opinions” (James, Will to Believe, 77); 
see Leary, “New Insights,” 12 and especially the appendix; also see 
Schopenhauer, The World, 2:160–87, and Essays and Aphorisms, 118– 
19). Perhaps it is worth noting that Immanuel Kant had treated 
“temperament” as well as “character” (even “character as the way of 
thinking”), but was as far as possible from recognizing psychological bias 
in philosophical thinking (Kant, Anthropology, 186–95). 
6 James, Pragmatism, 13. 
7  James, 11. 
8  James, 11. 
9 See James, Principles, 2:1144–56, noting the comment on 1144 that 
the quality of willful action “is always due to the ratio between the 
obstructive and explosive forces which are present.” Also see James, 
Varieties, chs. 4-7, noting the comment on 140 that “the radical extremes 
are somewhat ideal abstractions, and the concrete human beings whom we 
oftenest meet are intermediate varieties and mixtures.” 
10 James, Pragmatism, 14. 
11 James, 23. 
12 See, e.g., James, Radical Empiricism, 21–44 and 97–104. 
13 James, Principles, 1:193, capitals and italics deleted. 
14 For explications and assessments of James’s use of relational, 
overlapping, tentative, and far from exclusionary psychological 
terminology, see Leary, Routledge Guidebook. 
15 Bordogna, “Psychology and Physiology,” provides an excellent 
survey of the wide variety of descriptions, explanations, and attributions 
offered for temperament in the late nineteenth century. These explications 
provided different names, typologies, descriptions, and claims but no 
scientific specifications of supposed biologically determinative factors. 
And note that even “brain,” for James, was “a fiction of popular speech” 
(James, Principles, 1:178–9). 
16 Maudsley, Pathology of Mind, 236. 
17 Ribot, Diseases of Personality, 25. 
18 Jastrow and Baldwin, “Temperament,” 672. 
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19 For foundational scientific studies in a now-large and ever- 
expanding literature, see Thomas and Chess, Temperament and 
Development, Buss and Plomin, Temperament, Kagan, Galen’s Prophecy, 
and Bates and Wachs, Temperament. 
20 James, Varieties, 169. There is a striking similarity in the ways that 
James talks about philosophy and religion. Both provide a “vision” of “the 
universe” and/or of “life”: a Weltanschauung (or worldview), as he 
sometimes expressed it. But while traditional philosophy provides a 
“summary sketch” or “picture of the world in abridgment” (James, 
Pluralistic Universe, 9), religion represents “a man’s total reaction upon 
life,” including (among other things) both the emotions and the actions 
that life calls forth (James, Varieties, 36). Still, James implicitly leaves 
open the possibility that these two approaches to our lived reality might 
come closer and even overlap, provided that philosophy were to represent 
the response of the complete person, emotions and all, to “the world’s 
presence” (James, 37; this is, in fact, precisely what James called for. See 
the final sentences of this article). This would require that one “reach down 
to that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting 
presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious” (James, 
37). This “sense of the world’s presence,” which appeals to “our peculiar 
individual temperament,” makes us either “strenuous or careless, devout 
or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant, about life at large,” and this reaction 
on our part “is the completest of all our answers to the question, ‘What is 
the character [or “temperament”] of this universe in which we dwell?’” 
(James, 36–37). What would keep this more inclusive, expanded kind of 
philosophy, reaching beyond mere rational inquiry, from becoming even 
more equivalent to religion, traditionally defined, would be the absence of 
a notion of “the divine,” whatever that might be for any particular person 
(James, 34). But in flirting with philosophical pantheism at the end of his 
life, James allowed that “the place of the divine in the world” could be 
reimagined, just as the nature of matter could be, in a more “organic” way, 
resulting in “a more intimate weltanschauung” that provides a “vision of 
God as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator, of human life 
as part and parcel of that deep reality” (James, Pluralistic Universe, 18– 
19). The concept of “reaction” in the foregoing discussion, as in one’s 
“reaction upon life,” is an important notion in James’s thought, as 
discussed in note 25. (Clear echoes of Emerson here!) Bordogna makes a 
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similar assessment of the relation between James’s discussions of 
philosophy and art (Bordogna, “Psychology and Physiology,” 18–21). The 
additional relation of morality to temperamental responsiveness is touched 
upon at the end of note 25. 
21 In essence, in arguing for pragmatism, James used “temperament” 
and “type” pragmatically, providing a good example of the pragmatic 
method of focusing on the sensory (empirically evident) effects of a 
presumed (hypothesized) underlying reality. See James, Meaning of Truth, 
31; James, Principles, 2:929; and James, Pragmatism, 28. 
22 James, Pragmatism, 24. Italics added. 
23 It should also be noted that James never used more precise 
designations of temperaments themselves than vague references to 
“psychopathic temperament,” “insane temperament,” and the like. 
“Psychopathic temperament” was a particular favorite, especially in his 
Varieties (see, e.g., James, Varieties, 28, 132, and 142); but it was no more 
precisely defined there than “insane” or “neurotic temperament”  (James, 
27 and 29). The common-language implications of the individual 
adjectives rather than any empirically verified theory were expected to do 
all the work, as in his references to “sanguine” and “melancholy” 
temperaments (James, 115), “sympathetic” and “cynical” temperaments 
(James, Pluralistic Universe, 15–16), and “artistic” and “aristocratic” 
temperaments (James, “Review of Unüberwindliche Mächte,” 212). 
Elsewhere he spoke of “bottled-lightning” vs. “phlegmatic” temperaments 
(James, “Gospel of Relaxation,” 122) and referred to his own “impatient” 
temperament (James, “James on Tausch,” 190). Clearly, James used 
temperament-related language in a very elastic way, as when he referred 
to Spencer’s temperament as “the atmosphere” of his mind, which was “so 
fatally lacking in geniality, humor, picturesqueness, and poetry, and so 
explicit, so mechanical, so flat in the panorama which it gives of life” 
(James, “Herbert Spencer Dead,” 97). Of course, we get what James means 
descriptively, even without the provision of any physiological 
explanations. The elasticity of his use of “temperament” can also be seen 
in his attribution, however tentative, of “different temperaments” to 
“different races of men” (James, Talks to Teachers, 106). For example, 
“Southern races are commonly accounted more impulsive and precipitate” 
while “the English race, especially our New England branch of it, is 
supposed   to   be   all   sicklied   over   with   repressive   forms   of  self- 
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consciousness” (James, 106). Finally, with even greater metaphorical 
license, he extended the concept to nature and the universe, speaking in 
various places of “the temperament [or sometimes “the character”] of 
Nature itself” (e.g., James, “Notes for Philosophy 20C,” 326). This use of 
the term was meant to indicate that we have a personal relationship with 
our world, that we see and think about it in particular ways, and that we 
respond to it accordingly, depending upon (e.g.) whether we see it or want 
it to be wild and unpredictable or tame and orderly (James, 326–327). 
Some of us, James pointed out, feel more at home in unfettered, chaotic 
reality whereas others would prefer to live in a nicely groomed, artificial 
garden (James, “Letter to Hugo Münsterberg,” 241). 
24 Interests were absolutely fundamental for James. How they affect 
the actual process of selection was still a mystery, he admitted, but 
“possibly a minuter insight into the laws of neural action will some day 
clear the matter up,” though it was also possible that “neural laws will not 
suffice, and we shall need to invoke a dynamic reaction of the form of 
consciousness upon its content” (James Principles, 1:546–47; regarding 
the hierarchy of selectivity across the psychological spectrum, see James, 
1:1, 273–78). 
25 The concept of “reaction” deserves special mention here. Ever since 
James declared that modern evolutionary theory had made the reflex arc 
essential to modern psychology, the concept of behavioral response had 
become central to psychology. “Any mind, constructed on the triadic- 
reflex pattern,” he wrote, “must first get its impression from the object 
which it confronts; then define what that object is, and decide what active 
measures its presence demands; and finally react” (James, “Reflex Action 
and Theism,” 98). “The conception of all action as conforming to this type 
is the fundamental conception of modern nerve-physiology” (James, 
Principles, 1:35). The world is as it is, but how we react or respond to it, 
is crucial for James. And our responses are aesthetic and emotional, as 
well as intellectual and moral (see James, 1:273–77, 2:1058-59, and 
2:1164–82). The point is that we humans are not—and should not be— 
passive beings, suffering input from our environment; we have response- 
ability, we can react, and our responsiveness can lead to “action which to 
a great extent transforms the world” (James, “Remarks on Spencer’s,” 21). 
Our task, to put it broadly and philosophically, is, first, the “ascertainment 
of the character of Being” or Reality, and, second, if we find that it falls 
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short of what seems ideal, to change it, “no less!” (James, “Reflex Action 
and Theism,” 111, and James, “Letter to Charles Augustus Strong,” 342). 
Of course, what seems ideal will vary from person to person, so a 
philosophy is always “the expression of a [particular] man’s intimate 
character,” and “all definitions of the universe” are no more and no less 
than “the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon it” 
(James, Pluralistic Universe, 14). “Will you or won’t you have it so?” is 
“the most probing question we are ever asked” by the universe or by life, 
a question to which we respond “by consents or non-consents and not by 
words” (James, Principles, 2:1182). And our “dumb responses”— 
hopefully including action that will facilitate what is more ideal—are “our 
deepest organs of communication with the nature of things,” “the measure 
of our worth as men,” and “the one strictly underived and original 
contribution which we make to the world!” (James, Principles, 2:1182). 
This insight goes way back to James’s personal commitment, in April 
1870, to resist the pressures of the world toward what he believed to be 
inappropriate “fields of action” (James, “Diary [1]”), and it foreshadows 
his later statement that “we crave alike to feel more truly at home” in this 
universe and “to contribute our mite to its amelioration” (James, 
Pluralistic Universe, 11). In the end, “behavior,” which is to say, some 
response to our situation, “is the aim and end of every sound philosophy” 
(James, “Reflex Action and Theism,” 111). Interestingly, contemporary 
research on temperament, with its focus on “the large number of chemicals 
that monitor excitation and inhibition in the central nervous system,” has 
explored the impact that systematic individual differences in modes of 
reactivity—i.e., innate tendencies toward greater or lesser excitation or 
inhibition—have upon an infant’s disposition, ability to learn, and 
tendency to develop this or that style (or type) of emotional and behavioral 
responsiveness (see Kagan, Galen’s Prophecy, 51; also see ch. 2, 5, 7, and 
8). And though their proposed etiologies differ (Kagan’s being based on 
up-to-date scientific neurochemistry while James simply hypothesized 
varying degrees of “neural inertia”), Kagan’s excitatory vs. inhibitory 
types bear an uncanny resemblance to James’s explosive vs. obstructive 
forms of voluntary action, and both of their schemes emphasize the long- 
term consequences of habituation. (On James’s speculation regarding 
neural inertia, see James, Principles, 2:1142.) Finally, James discusses 
moral philosophy as ultimately drawn from one’s responses to the world, 
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including “the cries of the wounded” (James, “The Moral Philosopher,” 
158). On his “visualizing” and then “resisting, risking, and changing the 
ways things are,” see Leary, “Visions and Values.” 
26 Among the personal experiences that matter, as attested by James’s 
own life and work, are experiences with sickness and health, and how one 
responds to them, which become part of one’s personal make-up. Another 
kind of experience involves habit and habit-formation. One of this 
journal’s reviewers asked whether the cognitive and behavioral tendencies 
associated with this or that temperamental type could be undercut by the 
establishment of habits, for which James was such a vociferous advocate. 
James’s response would seem to be that, yes, some modification of 
temperamental expression is possible, but it is constrained by the range of 
interests (associated with temperament) that motivate a person’s selective 
attention and action. (See Bordogna, “Psychology and Physiology,” 15- 
18, for a consonant discussion of individual freedom and intelligence in 
light of temperament.) As regards the plasticity of both physiology and 
personality, James was clear that some flexibility and enhanced 
individuation are both possible and desirable, but any fluctuations or 
deviations will fall within the parameters (however broad or narrow) of 
one’s basic constitution, or so he clearly implies. (His discussion of “the 
law of inhibition of instincts by habits” is relevant here; see James, 
Principles, 2:1014-15.) In short, there are limits to the apparent and actual 
plasticity of individual natures. 
27 James, Pluralistic Universe, 7, 9–10. 
28 James, 14. 
29 James, 14–15. 
30 I apply the lessons of this article in “The Psychological Roots of 
William James’s Thought,” which will appear in The Jamesian Mind, 
edited by Sarin Marchetti. 
